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Terminable-At-Will Employment: New
Theories for Job Security
CLAUDED. ROHWER*
According to the theory of freedom of contract, the sole purpose of con-
tract law is to enforce the bargain made by the parties. The basic task of
contract doctrine, therefore, is to determine the intent of the parties in
making their agreement. The rights and duties of the parties will then be
based upon this agreement. Subject to certain judicially and statutorily
imposed limits, the law delegates legislative power to the contracting par-
ties, and the terms of the contract become the law that controls the parties'
rights and duties.' If the express terms of the contract are "the law" in a
contract case, then contract doctrines consist of legal procedures to imple-
ment for the parties the bargain that they have made for themselves.
Of course, the law places certain safeguards on the bargaining process.
In addition to requiring formalities such as consideration and possibly a
writing, the law protects those who lack capacity or who are victims of du-
ress or undue influence. A party to a contract may be released from a bad
bargain based either on mistake or reliance on a misrepresentation. The
basic philosophy commonly expressed as "you made your bed; you sleep
in it," is generally applied, however, and bargains are enforced as made.?
* PrOfessor of Law, Associate Dean for Graduate and International Programs,
McGeorge School of Law. The research upon which this material is based was accom-
plished for the 1983 Amicus Lex Lecture with the able assistance of the 1983 Amicus Lex
Scholars, Mark A. Ziemba and Kevin McCullough. David J. Holcomb ('85) assisted with
the preparation of this article.
1. See KESSLER AND GILMoRE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 1-15 (2d ed.1970). 2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 11 (Introductory Note).
"Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim thatpacta sunt servanda con-
tracts are to be kept. " Id
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A strict application of this approach when determining the nature of an
employer-employee relationship requires the rights and duties of these
parties to be based solely on their manifested intent. An employer's duty
to continue the relationship, and conversely, an employee's right to stay
employed, can only be established by the parties themselves.3
Theories of tort liability, in direct contrast to the theoretical "freedom"
granted to contracting parties, impose external standards upon the em-
ployment relationship. Tort law generally applies societal customs, in the
form of standards, to a person's conduct. Although tort duties can be
found to arise from words or other voluntary acts of the parties, the basic
rules of conduct that tort law imposes on individuals are based upon stan-
dards derived from the customs of the community and not from the terms
of an agreement between the parties. The extent to which tort law controls
the employer's right to terminate the employment relationship will be de-
fined by looking to the values, customs, and practices of the community.
The labeling of an employee's right to be free from improper termina-
tion of employment as either a tort or a contract right can lead to quite dif-
ferent results. A distinct policy choice is implicit in the decision of a court
to apply either one or the other doctrinal approaches. Ideally, the rights
and duties of parties should not be dependent upon the label used, but a
fundamental difference exists between enforcing an agreement made by
the parties and applying community standards to their relationship.4 The
label that is selected has an importance distinct from the question of the
measure of damages. The type of remedy available if recovery is granted is
not the central concern of this article. The primary purpose of this article
is to identify the method that a court should use to determine what duties
are owing and how the fact of breach of those duties might be established.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between employer and employee is the modern like-
ness of the feudal relationship of lord and serf.5 That relationship arose
out of status, which dictated the rights and duties of the parties. A person's
status in life was generally fixed by birth and in most cases, was beyond
the power of the individual to change. Even in the time of Blackstone, sta-
tus dictated the parameters of the employment relationship. The relation-
ship tended to be long-term and included such customary rights as that of
3. Whether one is enamored with the subjective or the objective theory of contract
interpretation, the intention of the parties is still the central element for determining con-
tract meaning and thereby defining rights and duties.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFTORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971).
5. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123- 37 (1969).
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the master to discipline his apprentice for wrongdoing.
A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or
other misbehavior, so it be done with moderation; though, if the
master or master's wife beats any other servant of full age, it is
good cause for departure.6
Status can be defined as a relationship determined by factors over which
the person has no control and can include elements such as kinship and
age. Many tribal societies distributed their resources by sharing, rather
than by bargaining, and a person's obligation to share rested upon that
person's status.7
As modem contract theory developed with the coming of the industrial
revolution, freedom of contract gradually replaced status as the source for
determining rights and duties in employment situations. Ih 1861 Henry
Maine wrote, "The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from status to contract."8 The development of the con-
cept of freedom of contract was an essential ingredient in the rise of the
capitalist economies because control of contract terms by individuals per-
mitted free commerce and mobility of resources. Freedom of contract also
provides a system of accountability for shortcomings in the production
and distribution of goods and services.9 For these reasons, freedom of
contract is also viewed as an essential element in international trade.10
The early part of the twentieth century may have seen the zenith of both
pure capitalism and pure freedom of contract in the United States. Al-
though neither should be pronounced dead, this century has witnessed an
erosion, or at least a softening, of both concepts. Societal notions of "fair-
ness" have been imposed upon our economic system and consequently,
upon our system of contract law. Before the beginning of this century,
freedom of contract between employer and employee had replaced status
as the basis for determining rights and duties. However, concepts analo-
gous to status have begun to return to the employment relationship. In
some contract matters, courts today are more disposed to ask "what is
fair," or to submit that question to ajury. The law in our society may not
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *428.
7. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 6 (1983).
8. H. MAINE, ANCIENTLAW 170 (1961).
9. In a conversation in December, 1983, with diplomats from the U.S.S.R.,
Gordon D. Schaber, Dean, McGeorge School of Law, was advised: "We read that you peo-
ple may have too many attorneys. It is most interesting to note that we are developing more
of them for Andropov has recently stated that we must have more precise relationship be-
tween state enterprises. Attorneys are needed to write and enforce contracts between state
agencies because without enforceable contracts, one cannot fix accountability for produc-
tion shortcomings." There was no discussion of the proposed remedies for failure to com-
ply with the terms of the contracts. (Notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal)
10. The contracting parties' intent must not be defeated by local custom and prac-
tice. See 1964 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Art. 7-9
(Document A/Conf. 97/18, Annex I).
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be satisfied with permitting the express terms, or lack of terms, in a con-
tract to "become the law between the parties" in all cases. I
This new notion of fairness in the employment relationship is a signifi-
cant contrast to the traditional relationship that treated even "perma-
nent" employees as terminable at will. The freedom of contract doctrine
virtually allows the dominant party in the negotiation process to dictate
the terms of the agreement. The dominant position of employers com-
monly produced employment relationships with no guaranteed duration.
Given the limited access of discharged employees to the courts, there has
been an extended period in which, for practical purposes, "permanent"
employment of indefinite duration meant "until someone changed his
mind." This apparently is still the law in many jurisdictions including
somejurisdictions that ordinarily are viewed as progressive.12
THEORIES TO GROUND RELIEF FOR IMPROPER TERMINATION
For purposes of discussion, several distinct theories can be identified in
which an employee might be permitted to bring an action over the termi-
nation of an employment relationship. 3
(a) An employee can sue for breach of the contract of employment.
This action has heretofore generally been limited to express terms of the
employment contract and to terms that can be implied using traditional
common-law techniques of contract interpretation. 4
(b) An employee who is discharged in violation of a statute that pro-
hibits discrimination on grounds such as race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, age, and sex can maintain an action based upon a violation of that
11. The extent to which the law between the parties to a contract may contain more
than the mere intent of the parties as interpreted from their manifestations is evidenced by
developments in the last three decades in these areas: (1) striking contract terms because
they contravene public policy; (2) adding contract terms which are perceived to be man-
dated by public policy; (3) excusing performance on the basis of mistake or impracticabil-
ity; (4) expanding contract defenses including misrepresentation and lack of capacity; and(5) excusing parties who did not read or could not read or lacked the ability to comprehend
what they signed.
12. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Products, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Ct. of App.
1983); DeMarcov. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
13. Actions for torts committed coincidentally to the discharge process such as
slander and intentional infliction of mental distress are beyond the scope of discussion
here. Note that there is some authority actually denying a ight of action for conduct that
would otherwise be tortious when it occurs in the course of a proper discharge. Murphy v.American Home Products, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236-37 (Ct. of App. 1983).
14. Contract law traditionally requires specificity of terms such that a court can de-
termine with reasonable certainty the fact of breach and any damages caused by the breach.
Indefinite employment contracts by their nature are uncertain as to duration, future wages
and benefitsjob description, and proper bases for discharge. Thus, an alleged "wrongful"
discharge traditionally presented issues for which the employment contract simply had no
answers. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (for modem approaches to this
problem).
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statute.'5 This area of lawis beyond the scope of this article.
(c) An employee can maintain an action for retaliatory discharge
when the employee was fired for refusing to commit a crime or for exercis-
ing a right given by the Constitution or by a statutorily created scheme en-
acted for the employee's benefit.16 The retaliatory discharge theory
recognizes an actionable wrong when an employee is discharged for ac-
tions such as serving on jury duty, 7 filing a workers' compensation
claim,"8 refusing to give false testimony under oath,19 or refusing to violate
the antitrust laws as implemented by a consent order of a court.2' A right
of action has also been recognized when an employee is fired for the pur-
pose of depriving him of pension rights.2"
Not all jurisdictions recognize a right of action for retaliatory dis-
charge. One court recently held that no cause of action results when a
nurse is discharged for refusal to falsify hospital records.22 Discharge for
refusal to commit perjury in a deposition was also held not to be actiona-
ble.23 Another recent case found no cause of action when an assistant trea-
surer was fired for following company procedures in reporting a fifty
million dollar irregularity in the records of the employer corporation.2 4
In jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action for firing in retaliation
for engaging in statutorily protected activity, a split of authority is found
on whether the resulting action is in contract or tort.' Because the facts
15. The availability of punitive damages under state law for a discharge that vio-
lates a statute adds to the potential damages in these cases. See, e.g., Cancellierv. Federated
Department Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
17. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512,516 (Ore. 1975) (jury duty); cf. Bell v. Faulkner, 75
S.W.2d 612, 614 (Mo. 1934) (discharge for refusing to vote as directed in a public election
held not actionable).
18. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 297 N.E.2d 425,428 (Ind. 1973);
Kelsayv. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353,358 (l. 1979).
19. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
188-89,344 P.2d 25,27 (1959).
20. Tamenyv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178,610 P.2d 1330, 1336, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 (1980). The potential for a treble damage antitrust recovery for dis-
charge in retaliation for refusal to perform acts that violate antitrust laws is being litigated
in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383-88 (9th Cir. 1982). A divided court
found that such an action could be sustained. However, the Seventh Circuit found no anti-
trust action in a similar case by choosing to follow the dissent of Justice Kennedy in the Os-
trofe case. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514,516-19 (7th cir. 1982)). The Supreme
Court denied certiorai in the Seventh Circuit case (103 S.Ct. 1261), but vacated and re-
manded the Ostrofe decision (103 S.Ct. 1244). One might anticipate that treble damages
under antitrust laws will not be available in retaliatory discharge cases.
21. Savodnickv. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822,824-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
22. Hinrichv. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977).
23. Phillipsv. GoodyearTire&RubberCo., 651 F.2d 1051,1054-58 (5thlCir. 1981).
24. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Ct. of App.
1983).
25. The majority ofjurisdictions recognizing a cause of action for a discharge that
violates public policy treat it as a tort, or allow both tort and contract recovery. See, e.g.,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176-78,610 P.2d 1330, 1335-36, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 844-45 (1980); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428
(1973); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512,515-16 (1975); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353 (111. 1979); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Pierce v.
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necessary to create the cause of action in retaliatory discharge cases will
not vary regardless of whether the cause of action is designated tort or
contract, the difference will manifest itself in the method used to compute
damages, the potential availability of punitive damages, and possibly in
the applicable statute of limitations.26
(d) Some cases now recognize a right of action for breach of an em-
ployment contract when the term breached is implied or inferred from
sources such as length of employment, general company policies as evi-
denced in employment manuals or otherwise, evaluations or other reports
pertaining to the employee in question, or other job related sources from
which a finder of fact might imply contract terms.27 This is simply a breach
of contract action that could be included under (a) above, but is treated as
a separate category because the source of contract terms is expanded and
represents a substantial departure from traditional interpretation of em-
ployment contracts.2"
(e) Recovery in tort or in contract by a discharged employee has been
permitted where the court found a breach by the employer of an implied
covenant of good faith or of good faith and fair dealing.2 9
(f) At least some members of the plaintiffs' bar are advocating that
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); Campbell v. Eli Lilly and Co., 413
N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980) (no cause of action found); Harless v. First National Bank in
Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W.Va. 1982); Reuther v. Fowler, 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1978). But
manyjurisdictions limit the action to contract theories and damages. See, e.g., Brockmeyer
v. Dunn & Brad Street, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983) (limits the employee's remedies to rein-
statement and back pay); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,552 (N.H. 1974); Bot-
tijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1981); see also Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 125 (Mass. 1977) (contract action for breach of implied cov-
enant of good faith); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Ct. of
App. 1983) (dissenting opinion); Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d I (5th
Cir. 1977); Catania v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980). Otherjurisdic-
tions have not yet recognized any cause of action for a discharge that violates public policy.
Some of thesejurisdictions resist application of ajudicially conceived tort remedy by stat-
ing that creation of such a remedy is better left to the legislature. See, e.g., Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 244 S.E.2d 272,276 (N.C. 1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.,
397 So. 2d 874,877 (Miss. 1981). But cf. Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510,
511 (La. App. 1974) (avoids application of public policy doctrine by sharply distinguishing
the facts). This resistance to allowing tort damages arising out of a retaliatory discharge
arises in other contexts. For example, Hudson v. Zenith Engraving, 259 S.E.2d 812 (S.C.
1979) held that a discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim did not
constitute "outrageous conduct" for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In addition, this jurisdiction does not recognize a public policy exception. See also
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. 406 N.E.2d 595 (IlI. App. 1980) (jurisdiction rec-
ognizing public policy exception).
26. Manyjurisdictions provide different limitation periods for the commencement
of contract actions and tort actions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§337(1) (four year
period for contract actions), 340(3), 304,305 (one year period for most tort actions).
27. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,329, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917,927(1981).
28. The difference between interpreting an employment contract using traditional
standards as distinguished from an expanded view of available sources of contract terms is
vividly demonstrated by comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nrv. 1983).
29. See infra notes 74,98 and accompanying text.
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courts recognize a new tort which might be called wrongful discharge.30
ACTIONS BASED UPON RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
When a statutory policy operates to the specific benefit of an employee,
a discharge in retaliation for exercising the statutory right has been found
to be actionable.31 In a distinct but analogous circumstance, a right of ac-
tion has been found to arise from a discharge in retaliation for an em-
ployee's refusal to commit a crime or violate a lawful court order.32
Retaliatory discharge has also been declared a valid cause of action when
the employee was fired for exercising a fundamental constitutional right
or duty.33
Once a cause of action can be established for discharge in retaliation for
conduct protected by a statutory scheme, this right might appear to be
easily extended to any case involving a well-recognized or easily identified
public policy. Numerous examples of judicially recognized public policy
could be identified. Many statutory schemes are also designed for the
public good, rather than for the specific benefit of a class of which the em-
ployee is a member. Mostjurisdictions that have granted causes of action
for retaliatory discharge, however, have refused to extend the concept be-
yond the three categories listed above: (1) exercise of rights granted by
statutes enacted for the benefit of employees; (2) refusal to commit a crim-
inal act; and (3) exercise of a constitutional right or duty.
In many jurisdictions one can track an interesting tug and pull on this
issue. The State of Indiana, as with most jurisdictions, starts with the pre-
mise that an employment contract for an unspecified time is terminable-
at-will at the election of either party.34 When the court finds a statutory
policy that operates to the specific benefit of the employee, however, a dis-
charge in retaliation for exercising the statutory right is held to be actiona-
ble. In Frampton v. CentralIndiana Gas Co.,3  a cause of action was found
to arise from the discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing a work-
ers' compensation claim. Subsequent cases have presented the Indiana
30. The issue whether facts exist to support a finding of "wrongful discharge" has
been presented to juries in trial court cases such as Norton v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (filed
March 19, 1981, no. 202088, Calif. Super. Ct., San Bernardino County). There does not ap-
pear to be any basis in the reported opinions for finding a separate and distinct cause of ac-
tion for "wrongful discharge" nor to identify it as one based in tort or contract.
31. Hentzel v. Singer Company, 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982);
see infra notes 36,38 and accompanying text.
32. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959); Tamenyv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,610 P.2d 1330 (1980);
cf. Hinrich v. Tranquilare Hospital, 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
33. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975).
34. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
35. Id
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courts with opportunities to expand the basis for a retaliatory discharge
action. In Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co.,36 however, the appellate court de-
nied relief to an employee discharged in retaliation for cooperating with
the Food and Drug Administration in its inquiry concerning the em-
ployer's products. The holding of the case made clear that even the pres-
ence of a state interest defined by statute or common law that would be
defeated if the discharged employee were denied a right of action was not
sufficient to induce the Indiana court to expand Frampton. The dissent in
this case, however, was convinced that a right of action should exist for
discharge that contravenes any clearly established public policy.
In a comparable sequence of cases, Illinois courts have taken a more ex-
pansive view of retaliatory discharge. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 37 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court recognized a cause of action arising from a discharge
in retaliation for the filing of a workers' compensation claim. A divided
court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.38 extended this tort ac-
tion to an employee who was discharged in retaliation for giving informa-
tion to the police indicating that a fellow employee had engaged in
criminal activity. The public policy that needed to be protected was the
benefit to society that inheres in citizens cooperating with law enforce-
ment agencies.
Another line of case law that is interesting to track in pursuit of the pa-
rameters of retaliatory discharge actions is the case law dealing with dis-
charges of employees who reported conditions that violated standards
relating to product safety or environmental protection laws. Cases have
distinguished between employees whose jobs involved preventing or re-
porting such conditions and those employees whose jobs did not.39 Con-
versely, cases do not support a distinction based upon whether employees
expressed their concerns within established or authorized channels of
communication in the company or "went public" with their information
or charges.4 Obviously, societal concerns are involved in these cases that
may have a significance comparable to the issue of individual employee
36. 413N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980).
37. 384 N.E.2d 353(Ill. 1979).
38. 421N.E.2d876(Il. 1981).
39. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 178-79 (Pa. 1974); Sheets
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980); see also Blades, Employment at
Willvs. IndividualFreedom, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1408 n.22 (1967).
40. A cause of action has been denied when a termination was in retaliation for the
employee giving a newspaper information about the employer's misconduct (Boniuk v.
NewYork Medical College, 535 F. Supp. 1353 (1982)); but allowed when the employeewas
fired for reporting crimes of fellow employees to the police (Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)). However, no public policy was found to have
been violated when the termination was for telling superiors of an unsafe product (Camp-
bell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980)) nor when the employee was fired
for writing a letter critical of the employer to a state agency even though the letter contained
untrue statements (Abriszv. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
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job security.
In a recent California decision,41 a complaint was found sufficient to
state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when state statutes ap-
peared to protect the specific activity for which the employee was alleg-
edly discharged. The facts alleged discharge in retaliation for demanding
a smoke-free environment in which to work. The opinion indicates that
the public policy upon which a retaliatory discharge can be based must be
predicated upon statute. The court held that state statutes that require
safe working conditions can be interpreted to give employees the right to
seek correction of unsafe conditions. Thus, these statutes create the po-
tential, on retrial, for finding a retaliatory discharge in violation of statu-
torily created policy.4"
A right of action for retaliatory discharge was first recognized in Cali-
fornia in Petermann v. Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters.43 In that case, a
business agent was fired for refusing to commit perjury on demand of the
employer." The opinion in the Petermann case did not indicate whether
the cause of action is in tort or contract, but in 1980 the California
Supreme Court declared that retaliatory discharge gives rise to a tort ac-
tion.45 Decisions in otherjurisdictions are split on this point.'
The right and duty recognized in retaliatory discharge cases are not de-
pendent upon the manifested agreement of the parties and cannot be ab-
rogated by the employment contract.47 Although this would not preclude
treating the right of action for retaliatory discharge as an implied-in-law
contract term, the obligation is actually one that is imposed by commu-
nity standards and placed upon an employer without regard to other
terms of the employment contract. The right arises from the status of the
individual as an employee and the action is thus better categorized as a
tort.4
8
Issues involving the scope of the employee's right and the appropriate
remedy to apply may also be more comfortably handled if the action is
one in tort. The absence of any express or implied agreement concerning
41. Hentzel v. Singer Company, 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
42. Id at 296-97.
43. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,344 P.2d 25 (1959).
44. Id at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
45. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839(1980).
46. See supra note 26.
47. In a retaliatory discharge action, proof of the existence of an employer-em-
ployee relationship is necessary to establish the status of the parties from which the law
finds the right not to be fired in retaliation for engaging in protected activities. The terms of
the employment contract as to salary or wage must also be shown to provide a measure of
damages. A term in the employment contract that purported to exculpate the employer
from liability for retaliatory discharge would be unenforceable. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92,383 P.2d 441,32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
48. See Tameny 27 Cal. 3d at 177, 610 P.2d at 1340, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845; see also
supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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duration and other future terms in the employment contract may present
obstacles if the action is based in contract.49
ACTIONS BASED UPON EXPANDED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
THEORIES
Actions for breach of contract brought by employees against employers
for wrongful discharge do not represent a new cause of action. No one
questions the right of an employee to enforce an express or an implied-in-
fact contract term that is breached by a wrongful discharge. In the cases
involving employment of indefinite duration, however, this breach of con-
tract theory has been difficult to develop because of common-law50 and
statutory assumptions51 that the relationship is terminable-at-will. This
interpretation is a stumbling block to a contract action for improper dis-
charge based upon implied terms in the employment contract. A second
problem arises out of the traditional requirement of a high degree of cer-
tainty of terms in a bargain before the bargain will be legally enforcea-
ble.52
A number of courts have rendered decisions that have overcome these
obstacles. One fundamental step that a court must take to accomplish this
result is to expand the sources of contract terms beyond the traditional di-
rect communications between the employee and employer at the time of
hiring or in other formal dealings relating to terms of employment. Agree-
ments may be "shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, interpreted
in the light of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances." 53
Employee manuals, handbooks, or other company generated documents
describing or defining terms and conditions of employment or employ-
49. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
50. Martin v. NewYork Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416,417 (1895); Parker v. Borock, 182
N.Y.S.2d 577, 579, 156 N.E.2d 297,298 (1959); Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (overruled on other grounds); Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134(1915); Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549,553,36 Cal. Rptr. 880,883 (1964); Ruinello
v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951).
51. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §2922.
52. Contract damages must be established with reasonable certainty. Failure to es-
tablish with certainty all of the damages that will be sustained would not completely pre-
clude recovery but will cause the plaintiff to lose those items of damages which cannot be
established with certainty. Damages for lost wages are somewhat analogous to lost profit
claims. Those elements of damage that can be established with certainty will be recovered,
but the trier of fact will not be permitted to speculate. Thus a wrongfully discharged plain-
tiff might use the rate of pay in existence at the time of discharge and the position held at the
time of discharge as a base for measuring damages, but under traditional contract damage
rules, the employee could not argue the prospects of higher rank and rate of pay as a basis
forfuture damages. Contrast this with computation of lost future wages in a wrongful death
case, for example, and one can see immediate advantages to the plaintiff if a cause of action
can be stated in tort.
53. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 678 n.16, 557 P.2d 106, 118, n.16, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 827 n.16 (1977).
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ment practices can provide implied terms of employment contracts. 54
Company statements can be incorporated into employment contracts
even when they were not presented to the employee or produced by the
company until after the establishment of the employment relationship.
Procedures for discipline or discharge have been found to become part of
the terms of an employment contract even when the provisions of the
company's "Employee Information and Benefits Handbook" were ap-
parently unknown to the employee until after the discharge.55
Although finding contract terms to be based upon such non-negotiated
and even uncommunicated provisions may be viewed as a significant de-
parture from established principles of contract law,56 an analogous prac-
tice is accepted in labor law. The terms of a collective bargaining
agreement become the basis of employment contracts between manage-
ment and a newly hired employee without the benefit of any negotiation
or discussion of the subject, or any requirement that the employee have
express knowledge of the terms. Similarly, a party may enter a contract,
such as a fire and casualty insurance policy, and acquirevarious rights and
duties without any negotiation or any clear notion of the precise terms of
the agreement. Other sources of implied terms or inferred terms in em-
54. Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., Inc., 576 P.2d 356 (Ore. 1978);
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal.
App. 3d 31 r, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917(1981); seeNote, Implied Contract Rights toJob Security,26
STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
55. See Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983). Faculty hand-
books can likewise be found to be part of an employment contract. Id.; Miles College, Inc.
v. Oliver, 382 So. 2d 510, 511 (Ala. 1980); Sawyer v. Mercer, et. al., 594 S.W.2d 696, 697(Tenn. 1980). In a somewhat comparable situation, students can be found to have contract
rights with the schools that they attend based in part upon terms contained in a school pub-
lication such as a catalog. University of Miamiv. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1966);
Eden v. State of New York, 426 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1980); Lexington Theological Seminary,
Inc. v. Ottie David Vance, 596 S.W.2d I 1 (Ky. App. 1979); cf. Abrams v. Illinois College of
Podiatric Medicine, 395 N.E.2d 1061 (Ill. 1979).
56. One issue that can create problems in court opinions relates to the time at which
a contract of employment is made. The more conservative opinions are typically written
from the assumption that the employment contract was entered into prior to or on the first
day of the commencement of the employment relationship. Matters not discussed or even
known by one or both parties on that date thus are not part of the contract terms. A subse-
quently developed or distributed employee manual or other statement of employment pol-
icy thus has rough sledding trying to gain admittance into the inner circle of contract terms
because these would be typically disseminated as a unilateral act of the employer and
would not be the subject of "negotiation" between the employer and the employee in ques-
tion. This point is stressed, for instance, in the dissent in Southwest Gas Corp., 668 P.2d 261
(Nev. 1983). Those decisions which take a more broad view of employment contract terms
can usually be seen to operate from the assumption that the final statement of the relation-
ship between this particular employer and employee need not be manifested on the first day
they entered the employment relationship. The originally indefinite contract began to take
on more detailed terms and conditions as the relationship grew. A manual distributed by
the boss and initially left unread by the employee will eventually become an established
term of their contract after the manual and the relationship continued to coexist for a pe-
riod of time. Only when viewed as an agreement which is undergoing rather constant modi-
fication can an employment contract be understood to contain terms based on such thing
as assurances, longevity, and general practices and policies of the employer and the indus-
try. See infra note 58.
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ployment contracts can include the duration of employment, promotions
received, lack of direct Icriticism of work, assurances given to the em-
ployee, and the acknowleged policies and practices of the employer.57
ACTIONS BASED UPON BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING
In California, courts have recognized the existence of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in contract obligations.5 8 The question
is whether and in what circumstances this implied covenant can be the
source of substantive rights. Numerous decisions have interpreted con-
tract rights and duties by applying a standard of good faith. For example,
sellers of goods who are authorized to set the contract price are required to
set that price in good faith.
In the case of Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co.,59 California
courts permitted a tort action to be brought against an insurance carrier
for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the
contract of insurance. This theory has been developed in numerous cases
against insurance carriers in California 60 and in other jurisdictions.61 The
question -that remains unanswered is whether this new tort action will be
extended to contracts of employment.6'
The author has located two California appellate cases that find a cause
of action in tort for breach of a contract duty of good faith and fair dealing
57. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d. 311,327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925-26 (1981). The thoughtful imagination brought to bear on finding a wide range of
sources for implied and inferred terms of employment contracts may reach its zenith when
the courts face the question of how properly to dispose of the constructive discharge cases
that are certain to come in the near future. Employees who quit because they do not receive
the cost of living raises or benefit enhancements that are afforded to their colleagues or who
are reassigned to less desirablejobs or work stations can be expected to claim that they were
forced into involuntary resignations. See R. BAXTER & J. FARRELL, CONSTRUCTIVE DIs-
CHARGE - WHEN QUITTING MEANS BEING FIRED, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LAW JOUR-
NAL 7(3), 346-68 (1981-82).
58. E.g., Vale v. Union Bank, 88 Cal. App. 3d 330,151 Cal. Rptr. 784(1979);Wag-
nerv. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980). But cf. Witt v. Union Oil Co.
of California, 99 Cal. App. 3d 435, 160 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979) (covenant not implied against
express terms of contract or to supply a term on a matter as to which contract is intention-
ally silent).
59. 50 Cal. 2d 654,328 P.2d 198(1958).
60. E.g., Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn., 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452,521 P.2d 1103, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Austero v. National Cas. Co. of Detroit, Michigan, 84 Cal. App. 3d 1,
148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Intermountain Casualty Co., 364 P.2d 856 (N.M. 1961);
Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (I. 1980). But cf D'Ambrosio v.
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 431 A.2d 966,970 (Pa. 1981).
62. "While breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may give
rise to a cause of action sounding in tort in the insurance field (citing cases), we are not
aware of-any appellate court case, and none has been cited, extending that principle to
other contractual relationships." Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights
Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802,822 n.8 (1977).
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arising from a contract other than an insurance contract. Both are court of
appeal decisions rendered in the Los Angeles District and neither is
founded on any statutory authority or case holding outside of the insur-
ance field. Cleary v. American Airlines,6" discussed in the next section, is a
discharge case that finds a tort relying exclusively on cases involving in-
surance carriers and their insureds.' 4 The second case is Smithers v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studio, Inc.65
The Smithers case involves a demand by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer that
one of the stars of a TV series, Smithers, accept an MGM dictated modifi-
cation in the terms of an existing contract. An official of MGM advised
Smithers' agent that if Smithers did not accept the modification, MGM
would be "hard pressed to use Mr. Smithers again" and might also get
CBS to agree not to hire Mr. Smithers in the future.66 Based upon these
facts, the trial court submitted to thejury the issue of tortious breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the appellate court
affirmed the resulting judgment.
The case upon which the Smithers decision appears to place primary re-
liance is Sawyer v. Bank ofAmerica.67 Although Sawyer contains dicta that
the Smithers court found useful,68 Sawyer actually reversed a trial court
judgment that awarded damages on a tort theory for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sawyer cited two cases in support
of its broad dicta. Each of those cases identified a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing but utilized that covenant not as a substantive right but
simply as a means for interpretation.
One of the cases cited in Sawyer, Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club v. City of
Berkeley,69 is a case in which the defendant city was enjoined from chang-
ing the use of the land on which bowling greens were located. The city his-
torically had maintained the greens and an adjoining lawn bowling
clubhouse. The city rented the clubhouse to plaintiff for twenty years to be
used exclusively as a bowling green clubhouse. Approximately nine years
later, the city announced plans to discontinue bowling on the greens. The
issue before the court concerned the question whether implied promises
were present in a contract of this nature. The trial court found an implied
promise by the city to continue operating the two bowling greens, and the
63. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
64. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
65. Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20
(1983).
66. Id. at 648, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
67. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
68. "[TIhe tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing con-
sists in bad faith action, extraneous to the contract, with the motive intentionally to frus-
trate the obligee's enjoyment of contract rights." Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
69. 42 Cal. App. 3d 280, 116 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1974).
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appellate court affirmed, stating that every contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That covenant imposes the duty
on both parties to do everything that the contract presupposes that they
will do to accomplish its purpose. The critical promise implied in the
agreement was the promise of the city to continue operating the lawns so
that the clubhouse operation would be profitable. The implied good faith
covenant was not analytically necessary to allow the court to find the sub-
stantive promise.
The second case relied upon by Sawyer for its dicta is Brewer 1'. Simp-
son.7' This case involves the enforcement of a contract between a childless
husband and wife to make mutual wills giving the survivor rights to the
whole of each of their estates and splitting the property equally among
collateral relatives upon the death of the survivor. After the death of the
husband, the wife attempted to convey property subject to the contract to
her second husband without adequate consideration and in frustration of
the relatives' expectancies. In holding that the wife could not breach her
contract in this fashion, the court made the statement that her contract
obligations were subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.7 This statement was apparently made for the sole purpose of
supporting the court's determination that the contract in question con-
tained an implied promise not to dispose of the property in a manner that
would defeat the express promises that the parties had made.
Other cases can be cited to support the proposition that a contract obli-
gation includes a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. These cases,
however, as in Berkeley Lawn Tennis Club and Brewer, involve interpreta-
tion of contract obligations and use the good faith and fair dealing analy-
sis to support a finding of other implied contract promises, which could be
implied with or without resort to the language of "good faith and fair deal-
ing.' 72
Two CALIFORNIA CASES: ALTERNATIVES FOR TOMORROW'S CASELAW
As the courts grapple with the proper course of the law relating to em-
70. Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567,349 P.2d 289 (1960).
71. Id at 588-89,349 P.2d at 300.
72. See, e.g., Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. etc. Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751,128 P.2d 665
(1942); Schooleraft v. Ross, 81 Cal. App. 3d 75, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978); cf. Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214(1917). So long as an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing constitutes simply a basis for finding or construing other contract terms, it can
be and has been used in a somewhat off-hand, nontechnical fashion in contract cases. If this
implied covenant is to be elevated to the status of being the one contract term the breach of
which gives rise to an intentional tort with a punitive damage potential, its use and meaning
in court opinions takes on far greater significance. Under these circumstances, it is cues-
tionable what significance can be placed upon the appearance of this language as an ad to
interpretation in decisions rendered before the tort theory of bad faith was invented.
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ployee discharges, two cases that present an interesting contrast will be
considered. In Cleary v. American Airlines,7" an eighteen year employee
was allegedly discharged for theft, leaving his work area, and threatening
another employee. Mr. Cleary's complaint alleged that he had an oral
contract with American Airlines for permanent employment and that the
terms of his contract included the employer's formal personnel regula-
tions, which contained policies and procedures relating to employee disci-
pline and discharge. Plaintiff's discharge was allegedly carried out
without an opportunity for the fair, impartial, and objective hearing prior
to discharge that was expressly required by the company regulations. The
plaintiff alleged his discharge to be wrongful and without just cause, but
judgment was entered for the defendant after the court sustained the de-
murrer to the fifth amended complaint.
Justice Jefferson of the Second District found that Cleary had stated a
cause of action that sounded in both tort and contract. The Justice identi-
fied two facts that he stated to be of paramount importance in reaching
this result. The first of these was the simple fact that plaintiff had worked
for the defendant for eighteen years. The court stated that termination
without legal cause after eighteen years of employment offends the im-
plied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all con-
tracts.74 Cases from the insurance field were cited and quoted. The second
factor that the court discussed was the employer's express policy concern-
ing dismissal procedures. Allegations of failure to follow those procedures
were stated to be a basis for a cause of action in both contract and tort. The
court thus recognized a tort cause of action for the contract breach. 5
Although cases with dual holdings are always subject to reinterpreta-
tion, the clear direction from Cleary is that long term employees, as a mat-
ter of law, have a right not to be fired without legal cause, and that the bad
faith cases from the insurance field are applicable to employee discharges.
If this is the law, then Cleary's tort rights cannot be affected by any ex-
press terms of his employment contract.
The second case, which poses the alternative approach, is Pugh v. See's
Candies.76 Prior to the Pugh decision, the California Supreme Court had
handed down the decision in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.77 Tameny
involved an employee who allegedly was discharged for his refusal to par-
73. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722(1980).
74. Id at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court, at 423, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728, cites
Coats v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 39 P.2d 838. The Coats case used the
term "good faith" in analyzing the implied-in-fact term of duration violated by termination
of an employee. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
75. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
76. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
77. 27 Cal. 3d 167,610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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ticipate in conduct that would constitute a violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, the Cartwright Act, and a federal court consent decree entered
in a prior case against Atlantic Richfield. The complaint alleged three
causes of action in tort designated as (1) wrongful discharge, (2) breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) interference
with contractual relations. A fourth cause of action was alleged for breach
of contract. The trial court sustained demurrers to the three tort causes,
but overruled the demurrer on the contract action. The plaintiff then vol-
untarily dismissed his contract action and appealed the judgments en-
tered against him on the tort theories.78
The issue squarely before the California Supreme Court in Tameny was
whether an action in tort or contract would lie. Atlantic Richfield con-
ceded that an allegation of firing for refusal to commit a crime states a
cause of action under the Petermann case, but took the position that the
cause of action was in contract and not in tort. Speaking for a majority of
the Supreme Court, Justice Tobriner held that the discharge of an em-
ployee for refusal to commit a crime gives rise to a cause of action in tort.79
This was the first clear resolution of the issue left open in Petermann as to
whether a firing in violation of public policy presented a cause of action
sounding in tort or contract.
In addition to declaring a retaliatory discharge case to lie in tort as well
as in contract, the Tameny decision is noteworthy for its statement that
punitive damages could be available. This is alluded to in the text of the
opinion and developed further in a footnote.80 Although the possible
availability of punitive damages in wrongful discharge cases has caused
concern among employers, the conclusion of the court does not appear
surprising. If a retaliatory discharge case gives rise to a cause of action in
tort, it is an intentional tort and no logical basis exists for contending that
punitive damages should not be available if the facts support them.
The other significant aspect of the Tameny case is dicta that implies a
relaxation of the Petermann rule, limiting actions for retaliatory discharge
based on violations of public policy to violations of statutorily expressed
public policy. The Tameny decision cites nonemployment cases applying
judicially conceived public policy and then states, "In light of the forego-
ing authorities, we conclude that an employee's action for wrongful dis-
charge is ex delicto and subjects an employer to tort liability." 81 The
"foregoing authority" includes two cases. The first finds tort liability for
the retaliatory eviction of a tenant for exercising his right to repair and de-
78. Id. at 171,610P.2dat 1332,164Cal.Rptr.at841.
79. Id. at 175-76,610 P.2d at 1334-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
80. Id. at 176-77, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
81. Id.
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duct. The second finds tortious conduct by a milkman arising out of negli-
gently performing his contractual duty to deliver milk. Read narrowly,
the Tameny case stands for the proposition that a tort cause of action is
available in cases involving discharge for refusal to commit a criminal act.
However, the case contains language that could be read broadly to hold
that a tort cause of action extends to all firings in violation of judicially
recognized public policy.
In a two sentence concurrence, Justice Wiley Manuel refused to adopt
the language basing the decision on broad notions of public policy, stat-
ing:
In my view the cause of action here in question flows from a
clear statutory source - i.e., the provisons of §2856 of the Labor
Code. Accordingly, I see no reason to search further for it
among the vague and ill-defined dictates of "fundamental pub-
lic policy." 82
Following the Cleary and Tameny decisions, Pugh v. See's Candies83
was decided by the Court of Appeal for the First District. Although the
Cleary decision had alternative bases for its holding, and although the ex-
pansive language in Tameny was dicta, the two cases certainly presented a
path to the development of tort remedies for all improper employee dis-
charges, if not the creation of a new tort that might be styled as "wrongful
discharge."'
The Pugh case involves an individual who began work for the See fam-
ily's company in 1941 as a dishwasher and worked his way up to vice presi-
dent in charge of production with a seat on the board of a subsidiary of the
defendant corporation. Pugh had been frequently told, "If you are loyal to
See's and do a good job, your future is secure. '85 Laurance See, the presi-
dent, had a policy of not terminating administrative personnel except for
good cause, and this practice was carried on by his successor, Charles B.
See. No formal or written criticism was ever made of Pugh's work. In 1968,
a Mr. Huggins wanted Pugh fired because Pugh had supported the posi-
tion of the primarily female seasonal workers in the union negotiations,
but Mr. See overruled Mr. Huggins, and Pugh never learned of that event.
Pugh was promoted in 1971 and received a gold watch in 1972. Thereafter,
the See family sold its corporations to Blue Chip Stamps, and Huggins be-
came president. Huggins asked Pugh to serve on the negotiating team for
82. Id at 179,610 P.2d at 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
83. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
84. Seesupra note 31 and accompanying text.
85. The facts summarized herein from the Pugh opinion can be found at 116 Cal.
App. 3d at315-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-20 (1981).
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renewal of the union contract. Pugh expressed concern by stating that he
would like to serve but had heard that See's had a "sweetheart contract"
with the union, and a different negotiator was found. In the spring of
1973, Pugh and Huggins toured Europe with their wives to inspect candy
making operations. Upon their return, Huggins summarily fired Pugh
without giving any explanation or granting any severance pay.
Mr. Pugh sued, alleging inter alia, that he was fired for refusing to en-
gage in the negotiation of an illegal collective bargaining agreement and
for refusing to engage in sex discrimination. These allegations were made
in an attempt to bring the case within the principles enunciated in
Petermann relating to retaliatory discharge.86 Pugh also alleged breach of
an implied-in-fact contract. See's obtained judgment without a trial on
the merits and Pugh appealed.
Because Tameny was decided while Pugh was on appeal, the appellate
court in Pugh was called upon to analyze Tameny and interpret its dicta.
Justice Grodin wrote the opinion of the court, stating that Tameny pro-
vides a tort remedy for discharge based upon refusal to commit a crime,
and for discharge in violation of statutorily created public policy. How-
ever, the court found that Pugh's allegations did not bring him within this
category despite the efforts to characterize his discharge as retaliatory for
refusing to participate in illegal activities. Although the decision on this
point indicates that the facts alleged were insufficient to justify a conclu-
sion that See's was asking Pugh to break the law, or that See's fired Pugh
for refusing to do so, 87 the appellate court reversed the judgment that had
been entered in favor of See's and remanded the case for trial. The critical
point in the opinion involves the bases upon which the case was to be tried
and presented to the trier of fact. Cleary presented authority for a tort the-
ory that would permit the plaintiff to present a case based upon violation
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Cleary opinion
states that termination of an eighteen year employee without legal cause
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing.88 Lan-
guage from Tameny could also have supported a tort theory in Pugh even
without solid allegations of retaliatory discharge.89 A step within appar-
ent reach of the court would have been to direct that a tort of "wrongful
discharge" was the isste to present to the trier of fact.
Instead, Justice Grodin's opinion directed the trial court to determine
whether See's had violated an implied-in-fact contractual promise not to
86. Discharge in retaliation for refusal to commit a criminal offense. Seesupranote
80 and accompanying text.
87. l16Cal.App.3d311,322; 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,922 (1981).
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
89. See 27 Cal. 3d 167,177,610 P.2d 1330,1335,164 Cal. Rptr. 839,845 (1980).
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dismiss Mr. Pugh except for good cause. The plaintiff was not given a tort
theory to develop. The trial court was not instructed to determine whether
See's had violated a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 90
If Justice Jefferson had been promoted to the Supreme Court, or if Jus-
tice Tobriner had remained on the court, one might consider the dicta in
Tameny and the tort theory in Cleary to express the evolving California
law on this subject. But since Justice Grodin is now on the high court, it
becomes significant that in the Pugh opinion, Grodin limited the tort
found in Tameny to only those cases within the Petermann line. Grodin re-
fused to permit Pugh to take his case to the jury on any tort theory, thus
rejecting the position taken by the court in Cleary.
Two recent employee dismissal cases appear to support an interpreta-
tion of the Pugh case rejecting a broader application of recovery in tort. In
Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hospital District,9 the court dis-
cusses the source of plaintiff's alleged contract rights and the due process
protections owing to the employee from the public agency defendant. In
remanding the case for retrial, the court did not mention either a tort the-
ory or any right to present a tort issue to the jury. The second recent em-
ployee dismissal case is Hentzel v. Singer Company,92 decided in
December 1982 in an opinion by Justice Grodin, who was then still on the
appeals court. Hentzel was a staff attorney who did patent work for
Singer. Hentzel alleged that he was fired because he had complained to
Singer about the failure of the company to provide him with a smoke-free
atmosphere in which to work. In addition to alleging a firing in retaliation
for trying to obtain a healthier work environment, Hentzel alleged that
Singer failed to prevent other employees from "directly antagonizing"
him in various ways, including sitting next to him and smoking. Hentzel
attempted to state a total of five different causes of action in two different
complaints. The trial court sustained the employer's demurrer to all five
causes of action and dismissed the complaint. Justice Grodin's disposi-
tion of the five causes of action on appeal is consistent with his analysis in
Pugh. The court reinstated the first cause of action, firing in retaliation for
protesting hazardous working conditions, as a tort cause of action based
on Petermann. The court indicated the possibility of a finding that public
90. Finding an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate except for good cause is
not dependent upon a requirement of independent consideration beyond the employee
rendenng services and a court need not find a reciprocal obligation of the employee not to
quit his employment. Drzewiecke v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101
Cal. Rptr. 169, 173-74 (1972); Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36,37 (D.C.
Cir. 1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAC=S §80. Nor is it necessary for a court to
first impose and apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in order to find an
implied-in-fact promise not to discharge for good reason or good cause. Lord v. Goldberg,
81 Cal. 596,601-02,22 P. 1126, 1128 (1889); see Drzewiecke, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 703-04.
91. 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
92. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982). Seesupra notes 42 and 43.
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policy had been violated, based on a section of the California Labor Code
which declares that employees as a group have a right to seek improve-
ments in their employment situations (i.e., through collective bargaining).
This section has also been held to imply certain individual rights of em-
ployees. The Hentzel opinion stressed "the restraint which courts must ex-
ercise in this arena, lest they mistake their own predilections for public
policy which deserves recognition at law."' 93 After a lengthy evaluation of
other state and federal statutes calling generally for a safe and healthy
working environment, however, the court concluded that this cause of ac-
tion contained allegations that could sustain tort liability for retaliatory
discharge. Furthermore, the court upheld a cause of action for punitive
damages as a right that can flow from this tort, a view which is supported
by language in the Tameny case.94
The Hentzel court declared that the dismissal of an action for breach of
an implied contract term not to terminate arbitrarily or without cause was
proper, but instructed the trial court to permit the plaintiff to replead this
cause of action in light of the law set forth in Pugh, which had not been de-
cided at the time of the trial court proceedings. The court also reinstated a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the
antagonism plaintiff allegedly endured as a result of his complaints about
smoking.95
The decision in Hentzel sustained the dismissal of a cause of action that
attempted to state a tort for breach of an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing. Although the opinion contains language to the effect that this ad-
ditional cause of action is unnecessary in light of the holding of the court
on the first cause of action allowing a tort action for the Petermann type
breach of public policy,96 plaintiff's case in the trial court might be much
stronger if a general tort theory arising out of a good faith and fair dealing
covenant could be utilized.
Cases against insurance carriers have established a tort action for viola-
tion of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This cause of
action has been extended to cases involving employee discharges by the
Second District Court of Appeal in Cleary, but at the time of this writing,
none of the other courts of appeal nor the California Supreme Court have
adopted this position in any holding. In the author's opinion, such an ex-
tension is neither inevitable nor wise.
93. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
94. Seesupra note 81 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
96. 138 Cal. App. 3d291, 304, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 169(1982).
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES ON THE GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
ISSUE
Good faith and fair dealing has been discussed as a basis for a cause of
action in other cases. Three of those cases deserve brief analysis. Fortune v.
National Cash Register,97 a Massachusetts case, involved the dismissal of a
commission salesman who had the apparent good fortune of having a ter-
ritory in which major sales to a single customer were being negotiated and
consummated. The dismissal had the effect of cutting off the salesman's
right to certain amounts of the commissions that had not yet accrued. The
trial court asked the jury to return a special verdict answering the ques-
tion: "Did the defendant act in bad faith when it decided to terminate the
plaintiff... ?"98Thejury answered in the affirmative; the trial court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff; and the appellate court affirmed without
any inquiry into or comment upon the standards to be applied to answer
the question posed to the jury. The court did indicate that the plaintiffs
cause of action was in contract and not tort, and stated that the case
should not be viewed as establishing a general rule that all dismissals
would be subject to good faith standards.99 The latter expression appar-
ently was meant to be taken quite seriously because subsequent Massa-
chusetts appellate cases have affirmed trial court decisions that
distinguished the Fortune case on its facts,'0° and have reversed the trial
court decisions that applied the Fortune case in a "different" factual set-
ting.101
In Smithers v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer,"2 the Second District Court of
Appeal in California sustained an award of damages for tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the contract of a
television actor. The specific conduct cited as justifying a recovery in tort
was the threat to blacklist the actor by refusing to employ him in the future
and attempting to induce CBS to do likewise. The court quoted with ap-
proval the trial court judge's conclusion that the alleged facts fit "to a T"
97. 364N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
98. Id at 1255.
99. Id at 1257.
100. The courts have uniformly limited recovery to factual settings which duplicate
that in Fortune; i.e. a firing to avoid payment of commissions on sales already completed,
and have refused to apply Fortune to situations where the injury alleged is loss of income
based on future services. See, e.g., Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1379
(Mass 1980); Gerald Rosen Co., Inc. v. I.T.&T., 450 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Mass. 1983); Cort v.
Bristol Meyers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines,
438 N.E.2d 351,354 (Mass. 1982). But cf. Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21
(Mass. 1981) (bad faith termination damages included lost future commissions which were
only related to work already done).
101. See supra note 101.
102. 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1983); see supra notes 66-69 and ac-
companying text.
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the definition of bad faith contained in the Sawyer case dicta. 3
The New York Court of Appeal was afforded an opportunity to review
New York law relating to job tenure in Murphy v. American Home Prod-
ucts Corp. I04 Murphy's complaint had alleged that he was employed from
1959 to 1980 in various accounting positions leading to his last position as
assistant treasurer of the company. The complaint alleged that Murphy
had uncovered at least fifty million dollars in illegal account manipula-
tions of secret pension reserves and had reported these matters to the of-
ficers and directors of the company as required by company policy.
Murphy further alleged that he was fired in retaliation for reporting these
matters. The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint. 10 5 In view of
the overall direction that courts in several jurisdictions had taken in dis-
charge cases, an outcome favorable to the employee could plausibly have
been anticipated.16 The court of appeal did not leave anyone in suspense.
The first four sentences of the opinion read:
This court has not and does not now recognize a cause of ac-
tion in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an employee;
such recognition must await action of the Legislature. Nor does
the complaint here state a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, for prima facie tort, or for breach of
contract. These causes of action were, therefore, properly dis-
missed. Appellant's cause of action based on his claim of age
discrimination, however, should be reinstated.0 7
This 6-1 decision is considered shocking by some.108 The dissenting jus-
tice would have found no tort, but would find a contract breach of an im-
plied covenant that "... the parties will not 'frustrate the contracts into
which they have entered'...." 109
WHITHER GOEST THE DISCHARGE CASES
When faced with uncertainty and contradictory directions in common-
law decisions on a basic and critical issue such as job security, it is tempt-
ing to call out for legislation. In fact, legislation might have been appro-
103. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 23; see supra note 69.
104. 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Ct. of App. 1983).
105. Id at 233.
106. Seesupranote22.
107. 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
108. Professor Cornelius J. Peck of the University of Washington School of Law was
quoted in the April 18, 1983, edition of the National Law Journal, at page 3, saying: "The
New York Court of Appeals, which is a progressive court, is going to be ashamed of this re-
suit."
109. 461 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
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priate several years ago when the common law was not moving, and when
indefinite employment was still terminable-at-will. As we hover on the
brink of judicial solutions to these important problems, however, the
wiser course of action may be for the legislative bodies to give the com-
mon-law system an opportunity to seek an appropriate solution. The leg-
islature need not even repeal statutory enactments such as the California
Labor Code that establishes or confirms the terminable-at-will norm.110
After all, a California Code section that clearly established contributory
negligence as the law of the state did not preclude the common-law adop-
tion of comparative negligence.'1 I
A common-law solution to the job security issue that creates more
problems than it solves will invite a legislative response. So will a result
that places burdens deemed to be excessive upon groups that have suffi-
cient legislative clout to overturn those decisions. The courts today have
an opportunity to develop new legal principles applicable to employment
contracts that are better than what we inherited and which can accommo-
date the various affected segments of society.
A proper solution to the problem presented must be one that attains
four objectives.
1. The rules that the courts evolve must provide a significant measure
of job security to employees who have heretofore been unprotected. Soci-
etal attitudes toward employee rights in general, and job security in par-
ticular, have evolved significantly in the last fifty years, and the law must
respond to this new perception of what is an appropriate set of basic rules.
2. Discharged employees cannot all be given an automatic right to
present their cases to the juries without express guidelines to determine
rights and duties. "Will all jurors in favor of firing people please stand
up?" is not an appropriate approach in these cases.
3. The variables in discharge cases are myriad. Matters such as dura-
tion of employment, the level or position of the employee within the em-
ploying entity, employer practices, and the course of the relationship
between the employer and the specific employee in question are signifi-
cant. Any solution must accommodate and give legal effect to these varia-
tions.
4. Damages for discharges that are determined to violate the evolved
standards must be reasonable under the circumstances. "Letting the em-
ployer pay" without regard to the consequences is now recognized as fuel-
ing inflation and contributing to the export of jobs by damaging the
110. CAL. LAB. CODE §2922.
111. CAL. CIv. CODE §1714 (reinterpreted by Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13
Cal. 3d 804,532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, (1975)).
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competitive position of domestic industries. 1 2 Wrongfully discharged
employees degerve full compensation for damages sustained, but a find-
ing of wrongful discharge cannot become a basis for asking jurors to de-
termine how angry they are at the offending employer.
Adoption or retention of a contract theory as the sole remedy in the gar-
den variety discharge case has some clear advantages. That remedy can be
an acceptable solution which meets the criteria set forth above if courts
will utilize the newer contract theories and rules that have been expressed
in the progressive cases. Contract law need not be revolutionized to make
it compatible with the perceived needs of employees, but courts must em-
brace some new or relatively new contract law that has already found its
way into cases."'3
(a) Parties must be permitted wide latitude to establish contract terms
from all logical sources. The sources listed in Pugh provide a good starting
point.
(b) Neither a legal nor a logical basis exists for ignoring a formal con-
tract entered into between employer and employees. However, such con-
tracts should be deemed to be modified when they are not consistent with
actual practices, and the course of performance with respect to the em-
ployee in question and other similarly situated employees. In other words,
course of performance and the practices of the shop cannot be abrogated
by writings signed at the time of employment or even by written contracts
re-executed periodically thereafter.
(c) Courts should exercise the standards of judicial review of contract
terms that have been used in other areas in which contracts affect the pub-
lic interest and are entered into by parties of unequal bargaining power.
(d) Those jurisdictions that have preserved restrictive standards relat-
ing to the admission of parol evidence must consider relaxing those stan-
dards, at least in employment cases. Conservative approaches to contract
law that place undue restrictions upon contract modification must give
way. Employment contracts can evolve through conduct and communica-
tions that occur after the original hiring, and this process often continues
after the execution of a formal employment contract.
(e) Modern approaches to the measurement of contract damages and
the determination of recoverable elements of damages must be imple-
112. Allocation of costs to the business enterprise will raise the total cost of the end
product of that business. To the extent that such costs can be passed on as part of the price
of the end products, this contributes to cost-push inflation. To the extent that such costs
must be absorbed by the enterprise, these added costs reduce the profit margin or increase
the losses of domestic business and enhance the competitive position of foreig, employers.
Excessive punitive damages can contribute to higher prices, loss of domesticJobs, or both.
113. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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mented. Some certainty is necessary since damages must not be based
simply upon speculation, and the damages must be realistic. However,
loss of future earnings should be provable with a lesser degree of "cer-
tainty" than is required, for example, in a wrongful death case. Employ-
ment contracts are not the only area of contract law that would benefit if
contract breachers were required to pay a reasonably precise estimate of
the damages that they actually caused instead of some smaller figure that
can be established with precise certainty.
If courts can evolve a basis for finding employment contracts that (1)
comport with the reasonable understanding and expectations of the par-
ties to those contracts, (2) deny enforcement to terms that are the result of
overreaching or abuse of bargaining position, and (3) award damages that
actually compensate for the dollar value of lost expectations, then the
common law will have acquitted itself well in its quest for a solution to a
major social issue.
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